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TIMELINESS OF CLAIM OVER MARITIME INSURANCE CONTRACT IS TO BE
GOVERNED BY THE CONTRACT'S CHOICE-OF-LAW PROVISION RATHER THAN THE
COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF LACHES

American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association, Inc. v Dann Ocean
Towing, I nc .
756 F.3d 314
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
( Decided June 26, 2014)
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court for the District of Maryland's
decision that parties to a maritime insurance contract may elect to avoid the common law
application of the Doctrine of Laches by including a choice-of-law provision in their contract,
which requires the application of that jurisdiction's statute of limitations.

The American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection and I ndemnity Association, Inc. (the
"Club") sought to use the equitable doctrine of laches when fi ling a c ivil action for breach of insurance
contract with Dann Ocean Towing I nc. ("Dann"). 1 The Club, a non profit provider of protection and
indemnity insurance covering vessel owners and charterers against third-party liabi lities arising from
the ownership and operation of insured vessels, entered into a contract with Dann for a tugboat ?
Dann' s tugboat ran aground on a coral reef in 1998, damaging a barge. 3 Both the barge owner and the
United States asserted claims against Dann for property damage and environmental damage to the reef,
.
4
respective Iy.
The c laims were settled for a total of $ 2,170,000 in November 2001. 5 Despite originally
agreeing to contribute only $1,170,000 towards the settlement, the Club paid an additional
$2 78,552 .55, after one of the underwriters of Dann' s liability insurance became insolvent and could
not pay its portion of the settlement. 6 The C lub sought reimbursement from Dann for its additional
contributions, but Dann refused to provide any monetary relieC Thereafter, the C lub declined to
reimburse Dann for certain insurance c laims that would have otherwise been payable to Dann, which
totaled $131,085.4 3 . 8 Dann responded by refusing to pay its insurance premiums to the C lub for the
policy years between 1999 and 2001, which totaled $452,610.23. 9 The C lub filed an action against
Dann, relying on the doctrine of laches over the application choice-of-law statute of limitations
0
provision in the original contract. 1 In its pertinent part, the insurance contract stated: "any contract of
insurance between the [Club] and a Member shall be governed by and construed in accordance with
the law of the State of New York. In no event shall suit on any c laim be maintainable against the
[Club] unless commenced within two years after the loss, damage or expense resulting from liabilities,
risks, events, occurrences and expenditures specified under this Rule shall have been paid by the
Member." 1 1 The Club rel ied on the equitable common law rel ief by asserting that its delay in filing
was reasonable as it made various out-of-court attempts to obtain reimbursement from Dann, a delay
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that did not prej udice Dann, who asserted that the claim was time-barred under New York ' s six year
statute of limitations. 1 2
The doctrine of laches i s an equitable common law rel ief that has generally governed in
assessing the timel i ness of a maritime c laim. 1 3 The doctrine can be raised by a defendant as an
affirmative defense to a claim as long as the defendant shows (1) a lack of diligence by the party
against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense. 1 4 This
doctrine has commonly been applied when determining whether a claim i s time-barred irrespective of
any fixed statute of limitations, with certain exceptions. 1 5
The district court agreed with Dann that parties may elect to avoid the doctrine of laches by
including in their contract an enforceable choice-of-law provision that requires the application of
another jurisdiction' s statute of limitations. 1 6 The district court thus held that New York ' s six-year
statute of limitations barred all the Club ' s c laims except for one concerning the $ 76, 925.56
.
7
premiUm. 1
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit distinguished exceptions to the common application of the
doctrine of laches in upholding the district court ' s ruling. These exceptions include statutory provisions
that impose time-bars on personal inj ury actions arising out of maritime torts, 1 8 on certain cargo loss
20
contract claims under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 19 and on maritime salvage actions.
Additionally, the court relied on prior case law in which courts have allowed the application of contract
2
specifications regarding jurisdiction' s statute of l irnitations. 1 In doing so, it rejected the Club ' s
attempt t o distinguish prior caselaw due t o the procedural and substantive nature of the choice-of-law
22
clauses in each given j urisdiction. The court reasoned that even assuming the New York ' s statute of
limitations constitutes a "procedural" rule of law, New York law states that unambiguous provisions of
23
an insurance contract must be interpreted through its plain and ordinary meaning.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's j udgment in applying New York ' s
six-year statute of limitations to the Club' s claims arising under its maritime insurance contract with
24
Dann.
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